Can the Government Change Tax Laws Retroactively? by Barrett, Matthew J.




Can the Government Change Tax Laws
Retroactively?
Matthew J. Barrett
Notre Dame Law School, matthew.j.barrett.1@nd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew J. Barrett, Can the Government Change Tax Laws Retroactively?, 1993-1994 Preview U.S. Sup. Ct. Cas. 177 (1993-1994).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/817
FEDERAL TAXATION
Can the Government Change Tax Laws Retroactively?





Argument Date: February 28, 1994
From: The Ninth Circuit
ISSUE
Whether legislation amending an estate tax provision of
the Internal Revenue Code and applied retroactively violates
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause when applied to a transaction
which an estate entered before Case ai
Congress amended the provision?
mhis case
FACTS regarding
This case concerns the federal J of retr
estate tax liability of the estate of December 1987,
Willametta K. Day, who died on oversight, Con
September 29, 1985. Jerry W. amended the reqt
Carlton, executor of Day's will, estate tax deducti
sought and obtained a six-month 1986. The Ninth
extension until December 29, 1986 for test, invalidate
Day's estate (the "Estate") to file its retroactive applic
estate tax return. 1986 transaction.
During this six-month extension, the Supreme Cc
Congress enacted the Tax Reform should indicate w
Act of 1986 ("TRA"), Pub. L. No. relax the almost
99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, which to a successful attz
became law on October 22, 1986. In ation established I
Section 1172 of that legislation,
Congress added Section 2057 to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 ("Section 2057"), which
authorized an estate to deduct from the decedent's gross
estate one half of the proceeds of the estate's sale of quali-
fied securities to an employee stock ownership plan
("ESOP"). 100 Stat. at 2513-15. ESOPs are qualified pen-
sion plans which invest primarily in the employer's securi-
ties. (Incidentally, Section 7304(a) of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat.
Matthew J. Barrett is associate professor of law at Notre
Dame Law School, Notre Dame, IN 46556; (219) 631-8121.
2106, 2352-2354, repealed Section 2057 for the estates of
persons dying after July 12, 1989.)
As enacted, Section 2057 did not require the stock which
the estate sold to an ESOP to be owned by the decedent
immediately before death. Any estate that timely filed its
return after October 22, 1986, the date that the TRA became
law, could claim the deduction.
Between the time that the 99th Congress passed the TRA
and its adjournment, Congress considered several hundred
technical and clerical amendments to the TRA and approved
several. Only one proposed amendment, unrelated to this
case, however, pertained to Section 2057. No bill or resolu-
tion was introduced that would have added any condition on
the availability of the new deduction
in Section 2057 before Congress
Glance adjourned.
Specifically relying on Section
esents an issue 2057, Carlton used the Estate's
constitutionality funds to purchase 1,500,000 shares
ive taxes. In of MCI Communications Corporation
correct a drafting ("MCI") stock on December 10, 1986,
ss retroactively at an average price of about $7.47 per
nents of a federal share, for a total price of $11,206,000.
nacted in October Two days later, MCI's ESOP agreed
uit, using a lenient to buy the shares from the Estate at
e amendment's $7.05 per share, or about 26 cents
rn to a December below the mean market price for that
, the case is before day. The total sales price equaled
whose decision $10,575,000, or $631,000 less than
her the Court will the amount that the Estate paid for
whelming barriers the shares.
on retroactive tax- Carlton timely filed the Estate's
s earlier cases. tax return and deducted $5,287,500,
or one half of the total sales price,
from the gross estate pursuant to the
then-applicable Section 2057. The deduction reduced the
reported estate tax obligation by $2,501,161.
On January 5, 1987, and January 26, 1987, respectively, the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") issued an advance version
of, and then formally published, Notice 87-13 which stated,
among other things, that "[p]ending the enactment of clarify-
ing legislation," the IRS would not recognize a deduction
under Section 2057 unless the decedent had "directly owned"
the securities before death. I.R.S. Notice 87-13, 1987-1 C.B.
432, 442.
A bill which contained what became Section 10411 of the



















100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-432 to 1330-433, was introduced in
both chambers of Congress on February 26, 1987. As passed
on December 22, 1987, the legislation amended Section 2057
to impose additional limitations on the deduction, including a
requirement that "the decedent directly owned the securities
[sold to the ESOP] immediately before death." The amend-
ment applied retroactively, as if originally enacted in the TRA
on October 22, 1986.
Upon auditing the Day estate tax return, the IRS applied
amended Section 2057 and disallowed the claimed deduction
for the sale of the MCI stock because the Estate had purchased
the stock after Day's death and, therefore, Day did not own
the stock "immediately before death." Carlton paid the result-
ing $2,501,161 estate tax deficiency, plus interest, and filed
this suit for refund in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California.
In an unpublished order, the district court reasoned that the
retroactive restriction on the availability of the Section 2057
deduction was closer to a mere increase in the tax rate than to
the enactment of a wholly new tax. Because changes in tax
rates are reasonably foreseeable, the district court held that the
retroactive application of the 1987 amendment to Section
2057 was not "harsh and oppressive" and did not violate due
process. Accordingly, the court granted the government's
motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 972 F.2d 1051 (9th
Cir. 1992). In determining whether retroactive application of
the 1987 amendment was "unduly harsh and oppressive," the
Ninth Circuit looked to two factors: (1) whether the taxpayer
had actual or constructive notice that Congress would retroac-
tively amend the statute, and (2) whether the taxpayer detri-
mentally and reasonably relied on the pre-amendment statute.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that, in the circumstances of
this case, retroactive application of the 1987 amendment vio-
lated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The
dissent, however, observed that, while maximum fairness to
taxpayers might argue that Congress should legislate accord-
ing to the majority opinion's two factors, the Supreme Court
had declined to adopt such a standard as a requirement for due
process. In addition, the dissent did not believe that Carlton
satisfied the two factors cited by the majority because the
Section 2057 deduction was "too good to be true."
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court
with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Carlton.
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehear-
ing and rejected a suggestion for rehearing en banc (i.e., a
rehearing before all active judges in the circuit). On October
4, 1993, the Supreme Court granted the government's petition
for a writ of certiorari.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The third clause of Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution
provides that Congress shall not pass ex post facto, i.e.,
retroactive, laws. Although the Latin phrase ex post facto lit-
erally encompasses any law passed "after the fact," the
Supreme Court has consistently held that the constitutional
limitation of the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to cimi-
nal enactments. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41-42
(1990). In non-criminal areas, Congress generally enjoys
wide latitude to legislate retroactively, especially when regu-
lating economic activity. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v.
R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717,729 (1984). With the Ex Post
Facto Clause unavailable to challenge the constitutionality of
retroactive non-criminal statutes, those attempting such chal-
lenges have had to turn to other provisions of the Constitution,
notably the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Outside the tax context, the Supreme Court has stated that
a retroactive application of a statute regulating economic
activity must be "arbitrary and irrational" to violate the Due
Process Clause. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
U.S. 1, 15 (1976). In the tax context, the Court determines
whether a retroactive statute violates the Due Process Clause
by asking if such retroactivity "is so harsh and oppressive as
to transgress the constitutional limitation." Welch v. Henry,
305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938). However, in Pension Benefit, the
Court indicated that the "harsh and oppressive" standard used
in the tax context "does not differ from the prohibition against
arbitrary and irrational legislation that we clearly enunciated
in Turner Elkhorn." 467 U.S. at 733.
In the last Supreme Court decision involving a due process
challenge to the retroactive operation of federal tax legisla-
tion, the Court recognized a distinction between legislation
which brings about changes in operation of the tax laws and
legislation which creates a wholly new tax. United States v.
Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 568 (1986); see also United States v.
Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 299 (1981).
In Darusmont, the Court upheld the retroactive application
of a new income tax provision signed on October 4, 1976 to a
transaction consummated on July 15, 1976. The proposed
change, however, had been under public discussion for almost
a year before its enactment. The Supreme Court described
retroactive application of general revenue statutes as "a cus-
tomary congressional practice." The Court acknowledged
that "the practicalities of producing national legislation"
required and permitted retroactive application "confined to
short and limited periods." 449 U.S. at 296-97.
In this case, the government stresses that the harshness or
fairness of taxation is peculiarly a social and political judg-
ment, which the legislature, not the judiciary, should make.
The government maintains that it met the burden for sustain-
ing retroactive legislation under the Due Process Clause by
showing that a rational legislative purpose justified the
retroactive amendment to Section 2057.
The government admits that the original language of
Section 2057 did not limit the deduction to instances where
the decedent owned the qualified securities at the time of
death. The resulting tax benefits, therefore, potentially
applied to any estate that purchased qualified securities on the
open market and resold the securities to an ESOP. However,
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under the government's view of the circumstances surround-
ing the original legislation, Congress did not intend the statute
to apply to transactions which had no purpose other than tax
avoidance.
The government argues, accordingly, that the 1987 amend-
ment represents a rational method of accomplishing a legiti-
mate governmental purpose. The government reasons that
legislation designed to cure errors in the drafting of earlier
legislation and to close loopholes unintentionally created dur-
ing the legislative process advances the public interest and
qualifies for retroactive, as well as prospective, application.
The government also argues that the change in Section
2057 at issue in this case does not constitute a retroactive
imposition of a wholly new tax. The estate tax existed before
Congress added Section 2057, and the 1987 amendment to
Section 2057 merely limited the Section 2057 deduction
which, the government observes, did not even exist at the time
of Day's death.
In response, Carlton argues that the "harsh and oppressive"
test requires the Court to consider both the object of the legis-
lation and its effect on the taxpayer. Carlton begins by argu-
ing that Section 2057 was only one of the extraordinary tax
benefits that Congress used to encourage the growth of
ESOPs. Thus, Carlton maintains that Section 2057's original
language was neither unusual nor surprising.
Carlton asserts that the facts in this case stand in stark con-
trast to the cases which the government has cited to support
retroactive changes. Initially, Carlton argues that the Estate
could not have foreseen the retroactive amendments to
Section 2057. The parties stipulated that Section 2057's orig-
inal language did not contain the requirement that the dece-
dent directly own the securities sold to the ESOP immediate-
ly before death. The parties also stipulated that neither the
several hundred potential amendments which Congress con-
sidered nor the several changes which Congress added to the
TRA before adjourning pertained to this requirement.
Additionally, the IRS did not issue the advance version of
Notice 87-13 until after the Estate had already purchased and
resold the MCI stock to the company's ESOP.
Carlton also emphasizes that the Estate suffered actual
injury by selling the shares to the ESOP for $631,000 less
than the Estate purchased the shares. Here, Carlton points to
the parties' stipulation that, if Carlton had not expected the
Section 2057 deduction, the ESOP would not have been able
to purchase the stock at a price about 26 cents per share below
the mean market price on the day that the Estate sold the
shares to the ESOP. Because the original legislation induced
the use of estate funds to pursue the public goal of ESOP
funding, Carlton argues that due process prevents the govern-
ment from denying the Estate the benefit that induced the
transaction.
The Court's decision may affect other estates which
entered into similar transactions with ESOPs, including those
that completed transactions after the IRS issued a notice of
proposed statutory changes but before introduction of the
amending legislation in Congress. After the Ninth Circuit's
decision in this case, the Fifth Circuit upheld the retroactive
application of the Section 2057 amendment to an estate's pur-
chase and sale of stock after the IRS issued Notice 87-13.
Ferman v. United States, 993 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1993), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3299 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1993).
Significantly, the Ninth Circuit majority alluded to this point
by noting that it might have reached a different conclusion if
the Estate had consummated the transactions after January 5,
1987, the date the IRS issued the advance version of Notice
87-13.
The Court's decision also could affect two provisions
which retroactively raise taxes in the Revenue Reconciliation
Act of 1993 ("RRA"), Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 416,
which President Clinton signed on August 10, 1993. First, the
RRA increases the federal income tax rates for more than one
million upper-income taxpayers retroactive to January 1,
1993. Second, RRA retroactively raises estate tax rates on
estates of decedents who died after December 31, 1992 to the
rates that existed in 1992.
On August 27, 1993, the National Taxpayers Union, Inc.
and the Landmark Legal Foundation filed suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, Docket No.
93-1796, challenging the retroactive increase in the estate tax
rates. Clearly, the district court will be looking to the Court's
decision in this case in deciding that challenge to the RRA.
ARGUMENTS
For the United States (Counsel of Record: Drew S. Days, III,
Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC
20530; (202) 514-2217):
1. The 1987 amendment to Section 2057 satisfies the require-
ments of due process because the legislation constitutes a
rational means to further a legitimate legislative purpose.
2. The due process formula which the Ninth Circuit applied
lacks a foundation in the Constitution.
For Jerry W. Carlton (Counsel of Record: Russell G. Allen;
O'Melveny & Myers, 610 Newport Center Drive, Suite 1700,
Newport Beach, CA 92660; (714) 669-6901):
1. Due process limits harsh and oppressive retroactive taxa-
tion.
2. The retroactive restrictions on the Section 2057 deduction
exceeded the due process limitation because nothing in the
provision or its legislative history forecast the retroactive
restrictions.
3. The circumstances distinguish this case from other cases in
which the Supreme Court has upheld retroactive taxation.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Jerry W. Carlton
The American Cause (Counsel of Record: Alan P. Dye,
1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 1000, Washington, DC
20006; (202) 785-9500);
Issue No. 5
Joint brief of Anthony C. Morici, Jr., as Executor of the
Estate of Carol M. McNamee, and Eileen McNamee and
Anthony C. Morici, Jr., as Trustees of the Carol M. McNamee
Trust Agreement (Counsel of Record: Charles C. Marson,
220 Montgomery Street, Suite 800, San Francisco, CA 94104;
(415) 398-6230);
Joint brief of the Washington Legal Foundation; United
States Senators Pete Domenici, Larry E. Craig, John McCain,
Slade Gorton, Bob Smith, Trent Lott, Conrad Bums, Kay
Bailey Hutchison, Connie Mack, Dan Coats, Jesse Helms,
Robert F. Bennett, William V. Roth, Jr., Malcolm Wallop,
Dirk Kempthorne, Strom Thurmond, Paul D. Coverdell,
Christopher S. Bond, Orrin Hatch, Alfonse M. D'Amato, Ted
Stevens, and Don Nickles; United States Representatives
Newt Gingrich, Chris Cox, Gerald Solomon, Dana
Rohrabacher, Robert K. Dornan, Deborah Pryce, Jack
Kingston, Bill Baker, Peter T. King, John Boehner, Steve
Buyer, Jim Bunning, Bob Walker, Joe Knollenberg, Cass
Ballenger, Mel Hancock, Rod Grams, Tom Ewing, Tom
Bliley, and Elton Gallegly; Governor Kirk Fordice of
Mississippi; and the Allied Educational Foundation (Counsel
of Record: Joseph E. Schmitz; Paul, Hastings, Janofsky &
Walker, 1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC
20004; (202) 508-9500).
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